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Abstract—This paper presents a novel search algorithm using
time-domain simulations to identify plausible N− k contin-
gencies endangering voltage stability. Starting from an initial
list of disturbances, progressively more severe contingencies
are investigated. After simulation of a N− k contingency, the
simulation results are assessed. If the system response is unstable,
a plausible harmful contingency sequence has been found. Oth-
erwise, components affected by the contingencies are considered
as candidate next event leading to N− (k+ 1) contingencies.
This implicitly takes into account hidden failures of component
protections. The performance of the proposed search algorithm
is compared to a brute-force algorithm and demonstrated on the
IEEE Nordic test system.
Index Terms—N-k contingencies, cascading outages, protection
hidden failures, voltage instability, time-domain simulation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today’s power systems are increasing in size and com-
plexity. Due to forces such as the globalization of electricity
market, where an increasing share of power is traded across
national and regional borders, individual (e.g. national) power
systems have stronger interactions with their neighboring
systems. Moreover, the increasing demand, the integration
of distributed generation from fluctuating energy sources and
delays in the reinforcement of the grid due to public objection
result in more frequent operation of the power system closer
to its limits. This may trigger cascading events, due to e.g.
component overloading.
In order to ensure uninterrupted power delivery, system
protection designers need to develop effective, automatic emer-
gency control schemes (also referred to as System Integrity
Protection Schemes - SIPS) against those rare but much
impacting events. For that purpose, identification of plausible
N − k contingencies is crucial.
Since brute-force approaches for determining harmful
N − k contingencies are infeasible, due to the bare number of
possible contingencies and their combinations, there is a need
for efficient tools and methods to identify plausible harmful
contingencies. In 2008 the IEEE PES CAMS Task Force
on “Understanding, Prediction, Mitigation and Restoration of
Cascading Failures” published an initial review of methods
for cascading failure analysis [1]. In this paper, the Task Force
concludes that the currently available methods for understand-
ing and mitigating are not yet well developed.
The methodology presented in [2], [3], [4] consists of
identifying plausible cascading events following an initial
disturbance. First a fault is simulated in the system and,
subsequently, a cascading outage event tree is constructed. In
this tree, different cases are investigated. The first fault may
be cleared normally or a clearance failure may take place.
Cascading events can on the one hand be hidden failures, such
as outdated protection settings or equipment failure, and on
the other hand tripping of overloaded equipment. Probabilities
are assigned to the individual events applying the rare event
approximation technique. In [4], a branch of the event tree
is explored using quasi-steady-state time simulation until the
probability of the event sequence drops below a threshold or
unacceptable system conditions were identified.
An approach applying the fault chain theory from secu-
rity sciences to assess the power system’s vulnerability was
proposed in [5]. A degree of vulnerability is determined for
transmission lines and sections in a power system based on a
new vulnerability index.
The authors of [6] developed a “Random Chemistry” algo-
rithm to identify minimal N − k contingencies, which trigger
large cascading failures. Their approach is based on the obser-
vation that a relatively small number of components contribute
disproportionately to system vulnerability. The general idea is
to randomly pick a large set of contingencies S0, which causes
cascading failures, and find the smallest subset Sm, which still
causes cascading failures. For that purpose, random subsets
of S0 are simulated. If the subset still causes system failure,
then S0 is replaced by it. This process is continued until a
subset with desired size kmax is found. Following, a pruning
approach is applied, which removes individual contingencies
from the subset and checks if a system failure still occurs.
In [7], the authors present a method, which utilizes data
from many cascading failure simulations to determine an influ-
ence graph. This graph provides information on how cascades
evolve in a particular system. The authors showed that outages
propagate non-locally and that their method allows to quickly
identify modifications that will reduce cascade propagation.
A method for identifying high risk N − k contingencies
based on network topology was presented in [8]. The authors
propose to reduce the complexity and size of the system by
converting it into a graph, where the nodes are functional
groups and the edges are interfacing components. Here, a func-
tional group is made up of components which operate and fail
together due to the connection structure and protection scheme.
Interfacing components are breakers and open switches. Then
high-risk N − k contingencies are identified based on rare
event approximation and event trees. The authors claim that
the method captures most N−k contingencies that are related
to protection malfunctioning.
In [9], the authors propose an algorithm to online identify an
event sequence, which may lead to a catastrophic failure. For
that purpose, probable contingency sequences are investigated
offline using power flow computations. The results are stored
and used online to identify a collapse sequence relying on
pattern recognition and fuzzy estimation.
The recent publication [10] reviews a number of existing
methods and evaluates them with respect to their suitability
for real-time applications.
In this paper, a new method is proposed, which aims at
identifying plausible and harmful N−k contingency sequences
using time-domain simulations. The method tends to provide
sequences with a small value of k, such that the system
experiences instability. Individual contingencies added to a
given sequence of disturbances involve equipment impacted
by that sequence, which implicitly takes into account hidden
failures of component protections.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Sec-
tion II-A, the search algorithm and its implementation into
a parallel processing environment are presented. Results ob-
tained from simulations of the IEEE Nordic Test System
are shown in Section III. Finally, Section IV offers some
concluding remarks.
II. IDENTIFICATION OF PLAUSIBLE AND HARMFUL
N-K CONTINGENCIES
A. Detailed procedure
A block diagram of the proposed search algorithm is shown
in Fig. 1. The input is a time-domain model of the power
system and an initial selection of contingencies.
In the following, the proposed algorithm is described in
more detail for the identification of harmful N −k contingen-
cies causing long-term voltage instability. However, it should
be noted that the algorithm can easily be adapted to deal with
other instability mechanisms. L is a list of N−k contingencies,
which is initialized with the aforementioned selection of initial
contingencies. As long as this list is not empty, the method ex-
tracts the next entry Ci and performs a time-domain simulation
beginning from the initial system operating point and applying
the individual disturbances cm ∈ Ci consecutively, with a
short-delay ∆t in between them. During the time-domain
simulation, the system state is monitored and the simulation
is terminated if an instability is identified. Depending on the
instability mechanism, different system states are monitored,
e.g. for long-term voltage instability the bus voltages are
monitored and compared to a threshold. Moreover, the model
may include protective relays, which monitor certain system
quantities and disconnect components to avoid e.g. under- or
over-speed of synchronous machines etc. Thus, the response of
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Fig. 1. Block diagram of the proposed search algorithm
protective relays can result in cascading tripping of additional
components. At the end of the simulation, the obtained results
are assessed to determine if it terminated normally and a new
stable operating point was reached or if an instability was
detected. If the contingency sequence Ci led to an instability,
Ci is stored in the list of unstable contingencies Lu. However,
if the system remained stable after Ci was applied and the
number of individual contingencies ki in Ci is smaller than a
pre-defined maximum number kmax, then the severity si of Ci
is computed and candidate ki+ 1 contingencies are identified.
How the severity of a contingency sequence is analyzed,
depends on the instability mechanism with respect to which
the system’s vulnerability has to be assessed. In case of long-
term voltage stability, it makes sense to consider the depression
of the bus voltage magnitudes. Hence, the following severity
index is proposed in this paper.
si =
1
ki
∑
b∈B
[max(0, Vb(t0)− Vb(te))]2 (1)
where B are all buses in the system, t0 the time at the
beginning of the simulation and te the time at the end of the
simulation. It is assumed that a larger value of si corresponds
to a more severe contingency. The square of the deviation
is used to increase the weight of large deviations. In order
to favor a small number of contingencies and a breadth-first
search like behavior, the sum of squared voltage deviations is
divided by the number of contingencies ki.
Afterwards, new candidate N − (ki + 1) contingencies
are determined. The aim is to identify component outages,
which are plausible as subsequent contingencies. For that
purpose, it is investigated, which power system components
were dominantly affected by Ci. These are good candidates
for the (ki + 1)-th contingency, since hidden failures of their
protections might lead to inadvertently disconnecting them,
in response to the contingency Ci. Appropriate indices for
identification of affected components are again dependent on
the instability mechanism that is investigated. In the case of
long-term voltage stability, the change of apparent power flows
in lines ∆Sj as well as the change in reactive power injection
of generators ∆Qj are relevant. They are computed as follows:
∆Qj = Qj(te)−Qj(t0) (2)
∆Sj = Sj(te)− Sj(t0) (3)
The proposed index aj , which expresses how much a compo-
nent j is affected by a contingency, is defined as follows:
aj =
{
α ·∆Qj , ∀j ∈ generators
∆Sj , ∀j ∈ transmission lines. (4)
In response to a contingency the reactive power changes will
be shared among several generators and, consequently, the
individual changes may be small in comparison to apparent
power changes in transmission lines in the surroundings of
the contingency. In order to allow a higher weighting of the
generator reactive power changes, the α factor is introduced.
A component j is considered to be affected if aj is greater
than a pre-defined threshold ath. Based on this, candidate
N−(ki+1) contingencies are derived, which are characterized
by the severity of the underlying N − ki contingency Ci and
the index aj of the added (ki + 1)-th single contingency.
Subsequently, it is assessed:
• if the candidate N−(ki+1) contingency contains exactly
the same individual contingencies as an already assessed
N − kn contingency;
• if a subset of individual contingencies of the candidate
N − (ki + 1) contingency was already found to result in
an instability.
If for a candidate N − (ki+1) contingency none of the above
conditions holds true, it is considered to be unique and it is
added to L. L is then sorted descending primarily with respect
to si and secondarily with respect to ai. After the update of
L, the algorithm extracts the next most severe contingency
from the list and continues the assessment. This process is
terminated, when all contingencies in the dynamic list L are
investigated and the list is empty.
B. Illustrative example
An illustration of the proposed approach is offered in Fig. 2.
It is shown how an increasing number of applied contingencies
progressively deteriorates the displayed bus voltage. Initially,
a N −1 contingency is simulated. The resulting stable system
response is shown with solid line. Various controls respond
to the disturbance as indicated in the figure. When the final
steady-state A is reached, the severity of the N − 1 contin-
gency is determined with (1) and the affected components are
identified with (4). Subsequently, one of them is considered
in the N − 2 contingency. In the enlarged detail shown in
Fig. 2, the occurrence of the two outages (c1 and c2) can
be observed. A new final steady-state B is reached, where the
severity of the contingency as well as the affected components
are determined. One of them is selected as third contingency.
The dotted curve shows the voltage evolution after the N − 3
contingency was applied. This causes severe deterioration of
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the voltage and triggers a cascading event. Eventually, the
voltage collapses.
C. Implementation into a parallel computing environment
In order to speed up the assessment and due to the fact that
every Ci in L can be simulated and assessed individually, a
parallel processing approach has been used. A visualization is
shown in Fig. 3. In this approach, a pool of workers is set-up
and initialized, where the number of workers is dependent on
the available hardware. The parameters for the simulations are
read as well as an initial list of contingencies. Some of the
data such as the lists L, Lu and a list of already simulated
contingencies need to be accessible for all workers. Hence,
these are stored in shared memory to which all workers, one
at a time, have access. After initialization, each worker runs
the part of the algorithm discussed in Section II-A, which is
inside the dashed box labeled “Worker X” in Fig. 1.
III. RESULTS
A. IEEE Nordic Test System
In order to demonstrate the performance of the proposed
N − k search algorithm, the Nordic test system set up by the
IEEE Task Force on “Test Systems for Voltage Stability and
Security Assessment” is utilized. The detailed data as well as
the operating points can be found in [11]. A one-line diagram
is shown in Fig. 4.
All MV loads are served through distribution transformers
equipped with LTC. Contrary to [11] the LTCs do not have
Fig. 4. One-line diagram of the IEEE Nordic test system [11]
constant tapping delays, but variable delays with an inverse
time characteristic.
In order to simulate the dynamic system response in more
detail, certain component protections were included in the
model. All generators are protected with a simple out-of-step
protection and an under-voltage protection. The out-of-step
protection trips the respective generator instantaneously, if its
rotor speed exceeds ±0.08 % of nominal speed. The under-
voltage protection considers two thresholds. The generator is
tripped with a delay of 30 s, if the terminal voltage drops
below 0.9 pu, but stays above 0.8 pu. It is instantaneously
disconnected, if the voltage falls below 0.8 pu.
B. Operating points
The proposed method is tested on different operating points,
which are described in detail in [11].
• Operating point B: Operating Point (OP) B is an N −1
secure operating point.
• Operating points B plus 50− 400 MW: Additional
six OPs are considered, where the loading of the Central
region (see Fig. 4) has been uniformly increased by a total
of 50, 100, 250, 300, 350 and 400 MW, respectively. This
leads to an increased power flow from the North to the
Central region and increases the stress of the system.
Due to the size of the test system, only up to three
contingencies (kmax = 3) are considered. Moreover, the
loss of generator g20 was not considered, since it represents
the connection to a large external grid aggregated into an
equivalent generator. The time delay between two subsequent
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF NUMBER OF INVESTIGATED CASES IN THE
BRUTE-FORCE (BF) APPROACH AND IN THE PROPOSED APPROACH
(N − k SEARCH) WITH ath BETWEEN 0.25− 1.00 PU ON 100 MVA BASE.
Approach ath
Number
N − 1 N − 2 N − 3of sim.
BF − 55 736 74 24 514 31 147
N − k search
0.25 7 980 74 812 7 093
0.50 4 364 74 586 3 698
1.00 1 935 74 370 1 490
TABLE II
COMPARISON OF NUMBER OF IDENTIFIED UNSTABLE CASES IN THE
BRUTE-FORCE (BF) APPROACH AND IN THE PROPOSED APPROACH
(N − k SEARCH) WITH ath BETWEEN 0.25− 1.00 PU ON 100 MVA BASE.
Approach ath
Number in-
N − 1 N − 2 N − 3stable cases
BF − 2 292 0 226 2 065
N − k search
0.25 1 595 0 222 1 372
0.50 1 196 0 207 988
1.00 790 0 176 604
contingencies ∆t was chosen to be 0.5 s and the weighting
factor α was set equal to 2.5.
A case is considered to be unstable, when the voltage at one
bus drops below 0.6 pu and remains below this threshold for
at least 500 ms. When an instability is detected the simulation
is terminated.
C. Performance of the proposed approach
In this section the proposed approach is compared to a
Brute-Force (BF) approach. In the latter, all possible combina-
tions of up to three component (generator and/or transmission
line) outages are considered. For that purpose, first, all N − 1
contingencies are simulated, then all N − 2 contingencies,
while omitting those that include an N − 1 contingency
resulting in instability. Finally, all N − 3 contingencies are in-
vestigated omitting combinations, including an unstable N−1
or N−2 contingency. It should be noted that, in order to keep
the number of cases limited, permutations of contingencies in
a sequence were not considered. The total number of cases
to be investigated, as well as a split into N − 1, N − 2 and
N − 3 cases is shown in Table I. In order to investigate the
sensitivity of the proposed algorithm with respect to variation
of the threshold ath, results for respectively ath = 0.25, 0.50
and 1.00 pu (on 100 MVA base) are presented and discussed.
Table I also shows the resulting total number of investigated
cases as well as N − 1, N − 2 and N − 3 cases with the
proposed method. It can be observed that in all three variants
the number of cases is only a fraction (3.4 − 14.3 %) of the
number of cases simulated in the BF approach. The results
show that halving ath results in an increase by a factor of
1.8 and 2.3, respectively. This is dominated by a rise of the
number of investigated N − 3 contingencies.
Table II shows the number of identified unstable cases with
the BF approach as well as the proposed approach for varying
ath. As expected, the results show that the test system in
OP B is N − 1 secure and no instability occurs for any
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N−1 contingency. The BF algorithm identified 2 292 unstable
contingencies. Of those only 9.8 % are N − 2 contingencies
and the remaining are N −3 contingencies. While performing
only a fraction of the number of simulations, the proposed
approach identified between 34.5−69.6 % of all unstable cases
depending on the chosen ath. The individual ratios are shown
in Fig. 5. In addition, let us recall that the proposed method
does not aim at identifying all unstable N − k contingencies,
but a subset of plausible ones.
When comparing the results of the BF approach presented
in Table I and Table II, it is striking that the number of
cases investigated is very large with respect to the number
of identified unstable cases. For example, to identify the 226
unstable N − 2 contingencies, 24 514 N − 2 cases needed to
be simulated. This can also be expressed as a probability. The
probability of identifying an unstable case when simulating
a N − 2 contingency is only 0.9 % in the BF approach. In
Fig. 6 the probabilities for identifying an unstable case with
the BF approach and the proposed (N − k search) approach
are compared. It can be observed that the probabilities of
identifying an unstable case are significantly higher with the
proposed approach than with the BF approach, where the
probabilities are between 0.9 − 6.6 %. An increase of the
probabilities with an increase of ath can be noticed. However,
it should be recalled that the number of identified unstable
contingencies declines simultaneously. For this reason, ath
should be chosen carefully taking into account the desired
identification ratio and the available computational resources.
In the remaining of the paper, a threshold ath = 0.50 was
assumed, since it allows identifying 91.6 % of the unstable
N−2 contingencies, while only performing 4 364 simulations,
which corresponds to 7.8 % of the simulations carried out in
the BF approach.
The considerable higher probabilities of identifying unstable
cases and the lower number of required simulations demon-
strate the benefit of the proposed approach.
D. Earliness of identification of harmful contingencies
The search algorithm is aiming at “fast” identification of
harmful contingencies, which lead to instability. In order to
assess this feature, the number of identified unstable N − 2
and N − 3 contingencies is shown in Fig. 7 as a function
of the number of performed simulations. Figure 7a shows
the results of the unstable N − 2 contingencies. It can be
observed that during the first 1 100 simulations the number
of identified unstable N − 2 contingencies rises quickly and
80 % of the unstable N − 2 cases identified by the proposed
method are found within this period. On the contrary, the
number of identified N−3 contingencies grows almost linearly
with the number of simulations (see Fig. 7b) and 80 % of the
unstable N−3 contingencies are identified after approximately
2 850 simulations (65 % of the total number of simulations).
E. Assessment of N-k contingencies at various loading levels
In this section, the effect of a demand increase as described
in Section III-B on the number of identified N −k contingen-
cies is discussed. Figure 8 shows the results in a bar graph.
It can observed that the absolute number of harmful N − k
contingencies decreases with an increase of the loading level,
which seems counterintuitive at first glance. While the number
of N − 1 contingency increases to 13, the number of N − 2
contingencies drops from 202 to 83 and the number of N − 3
contingencies from 988 to 277.
This observed decrease may be explained by the simultane-
ous increase of N −1 contingencies. While the original OP B
is N − 1 secure, the number of unstable N − 1 contingencies
increases steadily up to 13 in OP B plus 400 MW. Each
identified unstable N−1 contingency results in the elimination
of all unstable N −2 and N −3 contingencies, which contain
the N−1 contingency of concern. Similarly, each new unstable
N − 2 contingency eliminates all unstable N − 3 contingency
combinations containing that N − 2 contingency.
This also explains the temporary increase of the N−2 con-
tingencies when the additional loading increases from 50 MW
to 100 MW. At both OPs, there are three N −1 contingencies
and, therefore, the increased stress on the system translates
into a larger number of N − 2 contingencies.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a search algorithm for identification of harmful
N − k contingencies was presented. The method does not
attempt to identify all harmful N − k contingencies, but
 0
 50
 100
 150
 200
 0  500  1000  1500  2000  2500  3000  3500  4000
80
 %
N
um
be
r o
f i
de
nt
ifie
d 
pl
au
sib
le
 u
ns
ta
bl
e 
ca
se
s
Number of investigated cases
N-2
(a) N − 2 contingencies
 0
 200
 400
 600
 800
 1000
 0  500  1000  1500  2000  2500  3000  3500  4000
80
 %
N
um
be
r o
f i
de
nt
ifie
d 
pl
au
sib
le
 u
ns
ta
bl
e 
ca
se
s
Number of investigated cases
N-3
(b) N − 3 contingencies
Fig. 7. OP B: Number of identified unstable cases over number of simulations
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rather plausible harmful N − k contingencies assuming that
computational resources are limited and a brute-force approach
is infeasible. The approach uses time-domain simulations
to identify combinations of k contingencies leading to an
instability. A list of initial contingencies is provided. The
first contingency on the list is simulated and the simulation
results are assessed with respect to stability. If the system
remains stable, the algorithm investigates which power system
components were dominantly affected. These components in
combination with the applied N − k contingency are then
considered in candidate N − (k + 1) contingencies, which
are added to a list. The contingencies in the list are sorted
according to severity to ensure that the most severe are
investigated first.
The proposed method was tested on the IEEE Nordic Test
System, which was assessed with respect to its vulnerability to
voltage instability. The method’s capability to identify harmful
N−k contingencies was evaluated through a comparison with
the stability assessment results obtained with a brute-force ap-
proach. The results suggest that the method performs better in
identifying harmful N−k contingencies with smaller k, which
was targeted when defining the severity index. Moreover, it
was demonstrated that the method early identifies harmful
N−2 contingencies. Finally, the number of identified harmful
N−k contingencies in an increasingly stressed operating point
was investigated.
In the future, it is envisioned to test the proposed approach
with respect to other instability mechanisms and on larger test
systems. Moreover, the method will be extended to identify
stable but non-viable operating conditions and to evaluate the
severity of the identified unstable cases.
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